All blocks and limitations on downloads here have been removed. We request that bots and spiders be configured and monitored to avoid repetiveness, looping, recycling and checking previous downloads. Bandwidth trashing programs will be seen as attacks and blocked to assure access by others. Cryptome and a host of other crypto resources are likely to be shutdown if the war panic continues. What methods could be used to assure continued access to crypto for homeland and self-defense by citizens of all nations against communication transgressors? A while back a list of global sites for accessing crypto and privacy tools was set up: http://jya.com/crypto-free.htm This list of crypto sources, and additions to it, should be mirrored and the mirrors widely publicized to aid citizen access to tools for personal and homeland protection worldwide from those urging war and terrorism at home and around the globe. To supplement that, Cryptome would appreciate hearing by encrypted mail (anonymous remail too) what others have done or could do to stockpile and distribute self-dense tools. We've sent out a few hundred CDs of the Cryptome collection, and are considering offering here a ~100MB compressed package of the ~8000 files. If so, we would first make more of the packages available to other global sites to offset our bandwidth limitations. There are only a few crypto programs in the files, mostly PGP since 2.62. We might grab more for inclusion unless others are doing that. To comply with law we'd have to notify BXA of any new program offerings. Responses welcome: jya@pipeline.com Pipeline.com is owned by Earthlink, one of the ISPs reportedly now intercepted by Carnivore; Verio, host of this site, may be as well, your hosts too. John Young PK below.

wtc-junksci.htm     + WTC Asbestos Junk Science                        September 14, 2001

wtc-collapse-rc.htm + Reader Comments on WTC Collapse                  September 14, 2001
afghan-coup.htm     + Afghanistan and the "New Great Game"             September 13, 2001
wtc-hazards.htm     + Hazards of the World Trade Center                September 12, 2001
wtc-collapse.htm    + Comments on the WTC Towers Collapse              September 12, 2001
mc-gehee-db.htm     + NameBase to Google About Missing McGehee Posts   September 11, 2001

spy-state.htm       + Covert Operations and Spying Around the World    September 10, 2001
dod091001.txt       + DoD Secret Meets                                 September 10, 2001
cdc091001.txt (ok)  + Homeland BioWar: Diseases of the Food Supply     September 10, 2001
ta091001.htm        + High-Tech Workforce Training Programs in the US  September 10, 2001
mc-gehee.htm        + Ralph McGehee Censored Usenet Posts              September 9, 2001

sssca.htm           + Security Systems Standards and Certification Act September 9, 2001
homormon.htm        + Mormon Homosexual Problems                       September 8, 2001
unwanted-spies.htm  + Unwanted Spies in the Workplace                  September 7, 2001
echelon-ep-fin.htm  + European Parliament Final Report on Echelon      September 7, 2001
echelon-090501.htm  + European Commission Resolution on Echelon        September 6, 2001

O f f s i t e 


WTC-SPOT            ^ SPOT Satellite: WTC + 3hrs (220KB)               September 15, 2001

FM90-10             ^ Military Ops on Urbanized Terrain (1979)         September 15, 2001
WTC Hazards           Asbestos/Toxic Hazards at WTC /EM                September 13, 2001
Birdstrike          ^ Middle East Migratory Flyway Protection          September 13, 2001
WTC MFP             ^ World Trade Center Migratory Flyway Protection   September 11, 2001
GPS Risk            ^ GPS Risk                                         September 11, 2001

Spy Sat             ^ NRO Launch                                       September 11, 2001
DeNum                 DeCSS Executable Prime Number /TG                September 11, 2001
ARDA                  Intel Advanced Research and Development /EO      September 10, 2001
NRO Peek              NRO Secrets Most Jealously Guarded /WK           September 10, 2001
Bribe BR              Sale of Fighter Aircraft to Brazil /PG           September 10, 2001

MI X                  Ex-MI5 Head Blasts Official Secrets Act /J       September 8, 2001
CR Drugs              Costa Rica: Onion Model of NatSec /E             September 8, 2001
Cyberthug             Hollings' Idiot Computer Assault Bill /DC        September 8, 2001
AO Blink              Judicial Monitoring Backoff /JT                  September 8, 2001
MI Biz                MI5 Offers to Spy for UK Firms /J                September 6, 2001

15 September 2001

The landing gear wheel and stanchion often survives airliner crashes -- they are some of the strongest parts of an aircraft due to their design to endure several tons of impact upon landing. The bulk of engines survive too, and the framework that structurally connects the wings to the fuselage. Several fiery projectiles can be seen in photos rocketing from the south tower fireball, and these are probably the heavy parts that landed several blocks from the tower.

Parts of the exterior lattice were blown from both towers at the exit wound of the crash. More was rammed into the interior at the entrance wound. One photo of the north tower shows the tilted imprint of the aircraft wings in the exterior structure as the softer wings were sheared by the stronger steel while the fuselage arrowed through the wall.

Accounts have described fireballs shooting up and down elevator shafts, severly burning persons who happened to be in the cars, and others who had the elevator door open at the worst possible moment to emit a roar of flame. One man survived to tell the latter story though terribly burned.

However, it needs to be emphasized that the towers performed magnificently doing what buildings should do to protect occupants in a disaster. Thousands of lives were saved by safety features for fire containment, exiting, emergency lighting, and structural endurance in the face of horrendous forces.

Since the 1993 bombing architectural safety features were added to the towers along with training of occupants and staff for emergency response, as with all high-rises in NYC. These measures according to occupants worked much better this time than in 1993.

That the towers survived as long as they did allowed thousands to escape. Their unexpected collapse killed hundreds but had they collapsed upon impact the loss of lives could have been ten or more times as many.

I suspect that other downtown high-rise buildings which used other structural systems might not have been so durable. For example, nearby, 1 Liberty Plaza with its structure of long span steel beams with few columns and very wide open, highly glazed exterior might not have withstood the impact as well as the lattice structure of the towers which distributed the force of the aircraft impact over a web structural members.

Hard to say, though, for sure. The beams and columns of 1 Liberty Plaza, due to their span and infrequency, were much heavier than the exterior columns and floor trusses of WTC, so they might have taken the hit better.

Even the height of the towers surely helped absorb the impact by flexing as designed for wind load and earthquakes, where a shorter, stiffer building could have been shattered, sheared or even knocked over by buckling the base columns. These effects can be seen in buildings destroyed by earthquakes, where flexible buildings survive and stiff ones shatter.

Small observation: many of the photos of the site show the box columns used at the tower exteriors rather than more common wide flanges. And at the base of each column you can see the hand hole provided in box columns for steelworkers to reach inside the columns to attach nuts to connecting bolts.

It is amazing that many sections of the exterior lattice maintained their integrity after the collapse when everything else became nearly unrecognizable rubble. I recall seeing construction photos of prefabricated two-story lattice panels being lifted for installation.

The so-called rubble is a terrible melange of recognizable building parts, catwalks, struts, tie rods, blocking, elevator guides, spandrels, column covers and a thousand other fragments brought to life by architectural drawing details and specifications for materials.

One can imagine a partial reconstruction of the towers from these fragments as if an aircraft being studied by the National Transportation Safety Board, to see what urgent lessons could be learned to correct hazards in other structures and to prevent future failures. What a project that would be: to outdo Frank Gehry's benign disaster spectaculars designed by aircraft design programs.

According to news reports at least one of the alleged attackers was trained in urban development. The regional planning character of the attack is astonishing, more like a military campaign or regional planning scheme than simple suicidal terrorism. It would not be surprising that the architectural characteristics of the WTC towers were quite well studied beforehand, and that their collapse was carefully anticipated. I have not read in detail what the buildings' designers meant by saying "the towers could survive a hit by a Boeing 707," but it would be most interesting to learn what studies were done to make that claim, to see what were the chances of collapse, and if those studies were ever published in open literature. -- John Young

"Unlike transportation crash investigations, in which the National Transportation Safety Board issues reports as soon as possible so corrective actions can be taken to prevent other occurrences, as far as I know there is no similar national body which does performs that public service for building disasters. Celebrated local and insurance investigations, yes, and sometimes FEMA issues snoring assurances, but usually not the kind of meticulous reports by NTSB for every incident. Reports of high-profile disasters are released to the public piecemeal if at all, then quite later, and some of those are misleading, in particular about what could have been done to prevent disaster. It's as though because so many parties were negligent it is better to excuse all of them than to alarm the public. And, as ever, there are venal economic arguments that genuine safety costs more than the public will pay, architecture here mimicking transporation.

From this lack of reporting one might be led erroneously to believe that buildings are less dangerous than planes and trains, and not that real estate interest are more powerful than those of transport, especially in major urban areas like New York City, home of the world's largest number of millionaire and billionaire property moguls and their extensive network of financiers, lawyers, architects, engineers, builders, unions, building officials, suppliers, insurance providers, operating staff, investors and those of us who squat in their sky-high conceits in fear and trembling, head-patted by the world's greatest practitioners of "world class" architectural hype and deception (termed, humorously, "architectural criticism," which never criticizes distasteful building safety -- critics can't read building codes). Read the code of Walter Kirn's recent novel, Up in the Air, in which the main character describes how he came to trust the openly risky world of non-locational airplane travel rather than the hidden risk of architectura infirma."

-- Readers Comments on WTC Collapse, September 14, 2001

"The geo-politics dictated by geo-economics in Central Asia and Caspian region as well as the internal turmoil consequent to the jihad against the Soviet invasion has impacted severely on Afghanistan. Keeping Afghanistan broken and destabilized suits those who do not want the Caspian/Central Asian oil and gas pipelines to take one of the shortest and economical outlets over Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. The current situation in Afghanistan is thus dependent as much on external factors, which have fuelled the ongoing strife. The efforts for stabilisation of Afghanistan and restoration of peace cannot succeed in isolation. A sustained and institutionalised process of addressing concerns about terrorism or fundamentalism may produce positive results. Similarly, a more cooperative endeavour to stabilize the Eurasian heartland regions could bring handsome dividends to all regional and extra regional interests."

-- Norman Bashir, UK Ministry of Defense, Afghanistan and the "New Great Game", 2000. Reminds of MI-6 and CIA overthrow of Iran in 1953.

"From: DL
Subject: Better sprinklers?
To: jy@cryptome.org (John Young)
Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2001 08:44:44 -0400 (EDT)

Any comment on efficiency of sprinklers; and if standards for same may be upped to help protect structures....?

Is it even possible to pump enough H2O to protect steel?

JY: There are a variety of building fire suppression systems in use in addition to sprinklers, in particular where water from sprinklers would cause as much, or greater, damage than fire, in libraries for example. A common one uses halon gas, but there are other fire suppression chemicals such as airport and industrial firefighters use: foam, gels, and the like. All are expensive, but always get reviewed for imposing as building code requirements after a major disaster.

Systems to minimize architectural damage of suicidal aircraft are certainly conceivable, and the military has deployed exactly those systems at hardened bases and in ships.

Professionals involved in risk management (cruel term) -- insurance, fire, disaster, military, highways, medical, design -- customarily bemoan that their alarms are ignored until disaster strikes. Then much hand-wringing and blaming but only a smidgen of improvement in safety and security practices when cost estimates of improvements are studied, pretty muchly as done with terrorism -- which those who manage risk know does not begin and end with terrorists.

I used to claim that buildings killed more people than guns, to make a point of how deftly the real estate and construction industry camouflage the hazards of property ownership, and that no license was needed to own buildings, no training required to operate one of the great maimers and killers in human  society, especially as a consequence of collapse induced by shoddy, if widely acceptable, construction.

Now, as with wiser risker managers, I hold off on raising alarms in peaceful times and brace for disaster to strike. Meanwhile working with the few who continually upgrade safety and security standards between disasters -- as truly responsible citizens and officials do."

"As a young architect I was told and believed that construction in New York City was irreversibly corrupt. No longer, 30 years on. What I know now is that a small number of people at all times continue to work to improve the system for public safety and security, not just in NYC but in all human settlements. I am humbled to know and work with and learn from these few. I was never told about them in professional training, and you seldom read about them in the media. They work in government and private industry, in universities and hospitals, yes, and in what appear to be 100% venal professional firms. Many labor for much less than they could earn in the private sector, some pro bono, and some are those are in the Port Authority and similar public authorities for which I am most grateful knowing that the private and commercial real estate industry falls well below their standards of safety and security." -- John Young

"It appears to me that the sharp break at the left side of the Pentagon crash site shown in the Times photo occurred at an expansion joint which typically continues all the way through a building -- these joints allow for contraction and expansion of the building due to temperature fluctuations, and all buildings have them though usually not obvious. Also I think the left break occurred at a point where a shallow protruding section of the facade occurred. Expansion joints are often placed at these locations to conceal them, and it is at such surface changes that cracking would occur without expansion joints.

The upper level without windows shown in the photos is called an attic (floor). Sometimes they contain mechanical equipment or storage spaces which do not need windows. But when space needs increase attics get converted to regular use by the addition of mechanical ventilation to compensate for lack of windows.

I believe the Pentagon was designed to survive hits by conventional bombs of WW2-period power, that is to take the hits without catastrophic damage. The walls are constructed of quite thick masonry, windows are relatively small and interior structure is robust. The multiple inner rings also help diminish blast effects. The building was kept low-rise for that same purpose, with a capacious basement to house operations needing greater protection. (The basement was deepened by recent renovation; and the building's structural systems were reinforced as well).

All that appears to have worked in this case to contain the damage, compared to the much more fragile and vulnerable WTC, which might be said to have been designed as a perfect no-brainer terrorist target, not once but again after the initial bombing.

I did not know the Pentagon Renovation website existed (renovation.pentagon.mil) prior to its withdrawal.  It may have provided schematic information to the attackers but nothing classified.

When the White House was renovated in, I think, both the Truman and Kennedy eras, the building was structurally reinforced and a bunker-like basement was added. Currently there are plans for a vast underground structure there, or maybe it is being constructed. An environmental impact study of the new facility was circulated by the National Parks Service a year or so ago which showed the design in pretty good detail. That too may be under study for targeting, a threat surely considered by the protection services which certainly prevented publication of the classified features." -- John Young, September 12, 2001

13 September 2001: Thanks to EM for link to discussion of asbestos/toxic hazards at WTC: http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2001/9/12/192330/380

13 September 2001: The New York Times reports today that engineers who have studied the original WTC construction documents assert that asbestos was not used as a fireproofing material, as was common practice at the time and as presumed by the comments below (though other reports on Kuro5hin.org claim the material used did contain asbestos). However, city environmental officials state that other asbestos-containing materials were used in the building; tests show contamination at the disaster site by asbestos and other hazardous materials; and pose a danger to workers there but not to a wider area. Another report claims that the Port Authority in the past implemented asbestos remediation by encasement procedures though systems affected were not described. Encasement is likely to have been destroyed in the collapse. A remedition method which impregnates asbestos with a bonding agent could have survived the collapse and prevent blowing fibers.

"On the asbestosis threat, the WTC contained enormous amounts of asbestos. The two collapses probably released more asbestos debris at one time than ever in history. Today we saw dozens of workers clad in full asbestos protection suits resting, waiting to be sent back to the site. I've seen no photos of them in the news, nor mention of the great clouds of asbestos-contaminated smoke that has spread over the city, and continues to be spread as vehicles drive through the deep layers of contaminated dust on the streets and sidewalks. Blocks of buildings are covered with this carcinogen, wind whipping it regularly on its way to the outer boroughs and New Jersey, even out to sea to attack the protecting US naval fleet.

Again, the WTC was not required to comply with building and environmental codes governing asbestos amelioration due its being constructed by the Port Authority which was exempt from compliance."

-- Hazards of the World Trade Center, September 12, 2001

"From reading Why Buildings Fall Down a few years ago, I got a strong impression that this sort of initial-failure-overstresses-the-next-part-which-then-fails chain reaction failure is a very common design defect -- so common that you'd think a highly experimental $700 million building would have been analyzed six ways from Sunday to make sure it wouldn't happen.  If the interior contents of ten upper stories all suddenly fell on the floor of the next story down, was the building engineered to take that?

When the WTC towers were built there was extensive controversy over their safety in emergencies. The NYC Fire Department protested, as did a host of other agencies and professional associations. The buildings were constructed in bulk and height far in excess of what municipal constuction and zoning codes allowed. However, the Port Authority, a quasi-governmental agency with exceptional powers inherited from the regime of Robert Moses, was specifically exempt from compliance with municipal codes. The real estate, construction and finance industries were powerful supporters of the project.

Aside, I add that in 30 some years of examining buildings in New York, I have found none, zero, which are fully compliant with municipal building codes. It is a terrible, little reported scandal of the city in which it is considered to be bad business to fully comply with codes."

-- Comments on the World Trade Center Towers Collapse, September 12, 2001

"I received a reply from Google. I don't know enough about mime headers to elaborate, or to even challenge their analysis. Perhaps someone out there can help. Here is their reply:

In a message dated 9/10/01 7:52:20 PM Central Daylight Time, googletech@google.com writes:

> Thank you for your note.  It appears that Mr. McGehee is posting mime
> multipart documents. We only index the text/plain part of multiparts.
> In Mr. McGehee's case, depending on his settings when he posted,
> the text/plain part is often blank.
> 
>  Regards,
>  The Google Team

I asked someone who knows more than I do. She said:

__________

Google's explanation makes sense, but why they don't strip off the crap and just post 7-bit text is a mystery. I guess their algorithm is to strip off the MIME and leave whatever is left. In the cases in question: nothing but the tearline delimiter "--"

Rich Winkel does that in misc.activism.progressive -- in fact, he only sends out 7-bit text, which is why it's a pain to post anything with accent marks to his list. (He uses the old listserv program.)

That's why only 1 post in his group got chopped.

How does McGehee do it? He probably is using Netscape mail, or some other mailer like NS, which allows you to choose:

"send HTML mail ONLY" (McGehee's choice)
"send HTML and plain text" -- they caution this makes it bigger
"send plain text only"

For newsgroups and mailing lists, it makes sense to choose option 3. Most people choose option 2 for anything they send. Looks like McGehee chose Option 1."

-- Daniel Brandt, Update on Lost McGehee Posts, September 10, 2001

"Math professor Phil Carmody, who in March of this year managed to encode the DeCSS source in a prime number, has upped the ante by producing a prime number which represents an executable version of the banned CSS descrambler (http://asdf.org/~fatphil/maths/#Smallest). So here's that fascinating prime number, which incidentally just happens to defeat CSS:

493108359702850190027577767239076495728490777215020863208075
018409792627885097658864557802013660073286795447341128317353
678312015575359819785450548115719393458773300380099326195058
764525023820408110189885042615176579941704250889037029119015
870030479432826073821469541570330227987557681895601624030064
111516900872879838194258271674564774816684347928464580929131
531860070010043353189363193439129486044503709919800477094629
215581807111691530318762884778783541575932891093295447350881
882465495060005019006274705305381164278294267474853496525745
368151170655028190555265622135314631042100866286797114446706
366921982586158111251555650481342076867323407655054859108269
562666930662367997021048123965625180068183236539593483956753
575575324619023481064700987753027956186892925380693305204238
149969945456945774138335689906005870832181270486113368202651
590516635187402901819769393767785292872210955041292579257381
866058450150552502749947718831293104576980909153046133594190
302588132059322774443852550466779024518697062627788891979580
423065750615669834695617797879659201644051939960716981112615
195610276283233982579142332172696144374438105648552934887634
921030988702878745323313253212267863328370279250997499694887
759369159176445880327183847402359330203748885067557065879194
611341932307814854436454375113207098606390746417564121635042
388002967808558670370387509410769821183765499205204368255854
642288502429963322685369124648550007559166402472924071645072
531967449995294484347419021077296068205581309236268379879519
661997982855258871610961365617807456615924886608898164568541
721362920846656279131478466791550965154310113538586208196875
836883595577893914545393568199609880854047659073589728989834
250471289184162658789682185380879562790399786294493976054675
348212567501215170827371076462707124675321024836781594000875
05452543537 "

-- Thomas Greene, World's first DeCSS executable prime number, September 11, 2001

"I am e-mailing you on behalf of Ralph McGehee. Mr. McGehee, who lives in Florida, is a retired CIA officer who has written and lectured extensively about CIA misdeeds since 1981. Recently, all of Mr. McGehee's posts on the Google Groups Usenet archive since May 1998 were deleted. The headers remain, but the body has been replaced with "--". I called Mr. McGehee this morning to ask him if he requested or authorized Google to do this. He said no, and was not even aware that Google had acquired the Deja archive. I'd appreciate a report on what happened regarding Mr. McGehee's posts. Since Mr. McGehee did not request this, we apparently have a clear-cut case of criminal fraud on the part of whomever requested the deletion. The alternative -- that Google made the deletions at the request of 'higher authority' -- is something that I don't believe Google would ever do."

-- Daniel Brandt, Message to Google on Missing Ralph McGehee Posts, September 10, 2001

NSA Web site: "The Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA) is the intelligence community's (IC) center for conducting advanced research and development related to extracting intelligence from and providing security for information stored, transmitted, or manipulated by electronic means. ARDA sponsors high risk, high payoff research designed to produce new technology to attack some of the most important problems faced by the IC. The research is organized into three technology thrusts:

Information Exploitation,
Quantum Information Science & Photonics, and
Digital Network Intelligence." 

Thanks to EO.

10 September 2001:

DL writes: A random sampling of the URLs for Ralph McGehee posts produces in the message body only a "--." Apparently whoever took down the Usenet posts also took down those on Google.

Cryptome has verified this. Peculiar that only the message header remains. Information welcomed, from Anonymous who sent us the URLs or from others, on what has happened to McGehee's posts. Send to: mc-gehee@cryptome.org

AJ reponds:

"I tried duplicating Anon's search, and found that this only retrieves messages dating back to June 1998. It seems Google imposes an upper limit on the number of hits that may be returned for a single query. McGehee's posts prior to June 1998 can still be retrieved, but only by doing a custom Advanced Search for the date range 3/95 through 5/98. You can try this yourself.

I found that whilst many of his posts after 5/98 have been censored, all his posts prior to that date are still available - for now.

It appears somebody did a standard search on 'Ralph McGehee', which retrieved all postings dating to mid-98, identified the ones they didn't like, and instructed Google to remove them. This explains why all messages prior to mid-98 remain uncensored."

See Google's removal policy and more on this with the McGehee file. Cryptome has written Ralph McGehee for a response on the removal of his posts. So has Daniel Brandt, Public Information Research Group, a long-time colleague of McGehee's.

"As shadowy figures operating outside the law or conventions of war, spies are in some ways the ultimate agents of national interest. Intelligence cooperation between nations has therefore always been marked by a sense of ambivalence. Consider the case of the European Union: Many European analysts have touted the benefits of greater intelligence cooperation in an era of falling budgets, exploding information, and growing integration; indeed there has been an improvement in cooperation among Europeans (and with the United States) in some areas, such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics. Yet intelligence services are reluctant to support the idea of a truly united European approach to intelligence sharing. Cooperation has been even more halting among the member states of the United Nations, which faces vexing disputes over secrecy and sovereignty issues. Barring the dissolution of the current system of nation-states and the establishment of full-fledged global governance, intelligence-sharing relationships will remain significantly constrained by divergent policy interests, the fear of turncoats inside an ally's government, and the general need for secrecy.

Spying can be a vital support to democracy; but it can also have just the opposite effect if a regime fails to maintain a system of accountability over its secret agencies. Until recently, the intelligence services of every nation enjoyed immunity from close review by outside overseers: The philosophy was that, by necessity, secret agencies had to be divorced from society. While most intelligence services throughout the world continue to operate free from parliamentary supervision, in 1976 the United States adopted a system of legislative oversight for its intelligence activities -- an approach stemming from revelations that U.S. intelligence agencies were spying on their own citizens and subsequent discoveries that the CIA had engaged in assassination plots overseas. A few other countries, most notably Canada and Australia, have also established serious parliamentary checks on intelligence activities. Ultimately, in a democracy, the viability of an effective secret service relies on public respect. Oversight by elected representatives provides an important link between the people and the hidden side of government and helps to guard against the misuse of secret power."

-- Loch Johnson, SPIES. (state of covert operations and spying activities around the world), September 2000

Seymour Hersh said last evening at a Columbia University conference on investigation of international corporations that investigating intelligence agencies was child's play compared to seeking information about global businesses. He noted that you can meet with an intel representative even if its to hear a no comment, while businesses will refuse to meet at all, and if you are suspected of having damaging information, will sick on lawyers and knee-crushers. He stated that all -- all -- global corporate giants are "criminal." (Though later correcting that did not apply to Conde-Nast his current employer.)

In the light of MI5's soliciting customers among British global giants is there a move underway in US intel to do the same, going beyond what Woolsey and others cheerfully brag already? That is, our spooks must do it because our competitors do it, the argument made by US global corporations and DoJ and DoD and DoC, et al.

Oddly, not a single panelist or questioner at the conference, held at Columbia's School of Journalism, said a word about economic espionage, or Echelon, or Frenchalon. Hersh did say that the nefarious operations once performed by intelligence agencies for government and private customers are now being carried  by private burglars and headcrushers -- many staffed by ex-spooks. He did not name Woolsey, Woolsey's ex-KGB partner, or Deutch or his partners, or Kissinger, or ... He just waved his arm as if to say all of them are now private mobsters.

Another panelist, Stanley Penn, a longtime Wall Street Journal business journalist, said that corrupt businesses in all countries cannot operate without government complicity. He did not name the United States Government, but did say that governments are perfect obstacles to getting information about the deepest secrets of corporate crime, using most effectively claims of national security, though in the US FOIA and public records misleadingly provide more superficial data not classified in the national interest.

Appropo, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a talk on September 6 to State's Net Diplomacy team and said his first source of information early every morning is his home computer through e-mail, and bookmarked Web sites, stating that he then compares that to later, and not always better and certainly not quicker, intel reports. He encouraged the team to help State communicate faster and more reliably, and had appointed a former public relations executive to high office to help "sell the US. That is what State does."

Powell waxed about how much he had learned during global travels as a director of AOL, recounting a comment made by one telecomm exec that a single phone line into a country would be all that was needed to assure spread of US digital hegemony. Oops, Powell didn't state it so baldly, he called it easy access to non-classified information, consumer grade.

The use of the Internet to aggressively market the US/AOL way, one screen for the public, another for the intelbiz secret-webbers, on the basis of Powell's remarks, poses a greater danger to other nations, and US citizens, than Echelon disinformation, ineffective as EuroParl complicitly disinforms it to be and urges Euros to match the secret criminals.

Cryptome, 8 September 2001

From: "Nicoletti, Maryann" <Maryann_Nicoletti@mpaa.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2001 15:13:45 -0700

The Next Copy Protection Technical Working Group Meeting is Wednesday, October 3, 2001

October Presentation:

"Managing and Protecting Digital Broadcast Audio, Video and Data on Personal Computers" by Dewey Weaver, President & CEO accessDTV (for those of you not familiar with accessDTV, they are a manufacturer of Digital HDTV Tuner Cards for PCs.)

Details of CPTWG Location:

Renaissance Hotel
9620 Airport Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90045
310/337-2800

Meeting Schedule

8:00 AM Co-Chair Meeting Pacific Room [Private]
Continental Breakfast Renaissance Ballroom
9:00 AM Registration Ballroom Foyer
9:30 AM General Session Renaissance Ballroom
Breakout 1 Available 9:30 AM - 12:00 noon
Breakout 2 Available 9:30 AM - 4:00 PM
12:00 PM Lunch Renaissance Foyer
12:00 - 2:00 MPAA Meeting [Private] - International Room

Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2001 15:31:10 -0400 (EDT)
From: DCI/CIA Web Site Update <updates@ucia.gov>

September 7 - Posted Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000.

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm

"Was your boss looking over your shoulder at work today? More and more Americans work under electronic surveillance: E-mail, Web browsing, the bosses can see it all. But isn't it their right to do so? Welcome to 1984 Incorporated tonight on GREENFIELD AT LARGE.

You may have heard that the Justice Department today said it would not seek the breakup of Microsoft, but next week comes a judicial decision that could have a more far-reaching impact on how computers affect your life -- at least, your working life. The U.S. Judicial Conference is going to decide whether court employees, including federal judges, will be subject to monitoring of their computer use. In other words, their Web use will be tracked, their e-mail read.

If you think this doesn't affect you, consider this: If federal judges vote to live under this scrutiny, are they likely to rule that average Americans don't have to as well? And that's a question that courts have been dealing with, as more and more companies use workplace computers to track what their employees are doing."

-- Jeff Greenfield, Electronic Surveillance: Is It '1984' in the Workplace?, September 6, 2001

"Measures to encourage self-protection by citizens and firms

27.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to inform their citizens and firms about the possibility that their international communications may, under certain circumstances, be intercepted; insists that this information should be accompanied by practical assistance in designing and implementing comprehensive protection measures, including the security of information technology;

28.  Calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to develop and implement an effective and active policy for security in the information society; insists that as part of this policy specific attention should be given to increasing the awareness of all users of modern communication systems of the need to protect confidential information; furthermore, insists on the establishment of a Europe-wide, coordinated network of agencies capable of providing practical assistance in designing and implementing comprehensive protection strategies;

29.  Urges the Commission and Member States to devise appropriate measures to promote, develop and manufacture European encryption technology and software and above all to support projects aimed at developing user-friendly open-source encryption software;

30.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote software projects whose source text is made public (open-source software), as this is the only way of guaranteeing that no backdoors are built into programmes;

31.  Calls on the Commission to lay down a standard for the level of security of e-mail software packages, placing those packages whose source code has not been made public in the "least reliable" category;

32.  Calls on the European institutions and the public administrations of the Member States systematically to encrypt e-mails, so that ultimately encryption becomes the norm;

33.  Calls on the Community institutions and the public administrations of the Member States to provide training for their staff and make their staff familiar with new encryption technologies and techniques by means of the necessary practical training and courses;

34.  Calls for particular attention to be paid to the position of the applicant countries; urges that they should be given support, if their lack of technological independence prevents them from implementing the requisite protective measures;"

-- European Commission Resolution on Echelon, September 5, 2001

Advanced eBook Processor (AEBPR) "Colleen Pouliot, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for Adobe, said, 'ElcomSoft's Advanced eBook Processor software is no longer available in the United States.' " -- Adobe, EFF Call for Release of Dmitry Sklyarov, July 23, 2001 For background information and to download a trial version of the Adobe eBook-cracking program, AEBPR, see the ElcomSoft site: http://www.elcomsoft.com Cryptome mirror of the AEBPR trial version: http://cryptome.org/aebpr/aebpr22.zip  (746KB) For cryptographic scientific research allowed under the DMCA here is a key from Anonymous to boost the trial version -- which decrypts 25% of an eBook -- to its 100% capability (though not verified): LEPR-T2K7-NA8Z-3DUE-EVDQS-TMPV-MBAUB Thanks to ET: "To verify the unlock key for Dimitry Sklyarov's AEBPR application create the following STRING VALUE in the registry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Elcom\Advanced eBook Processor\Registration\Code and assign it the value of the registration key provided on your site: LEPR-T2K7-NA8Z-3DUE-EVDQS-TMPV-MBAUB Start the AEPBR application and you will be all set." Dmitry needs funds for legal defense. If you use AEBPR consider contributing to EFF or to Dmitry through PayPal. "Call for Technical Submissions I am interested in receiving and publishing the following kinds of information: Technical descriptions of the access control and encryption mechanisms associated with PDF files and/or eBooks. Technical descriptions of remedies for these mechanisms, e.g., patches, key recovery algorithms, modified plug-ins, etc. Source code for implementing these remedies. Mail submissions to Dave Touretzky. Anonymous submissions are fine." -- Gallery of Adobe Remedies (offsite)

"Ever-more subtle and sophisticated Panoptic mechanisms continue to reduce the individual's privacy and integrity. Panopticism continues to limit the space in which civil liberties can be freely deployed. In the face of manipulative technologies, inventive reverse-engineering strategies are necessarily distributed, multiple, simultaneous, hybrid, interdisciplinary, opportunistic. We recall the dazzling efficacy of Ariadne's fragile silk thread in the face of the Minotaur's brutality. Last night, panelists reviewing the challenges to civil liberties wrought by SDMI and DMCA underscored the need for resistance through collaborations that reach across disciplinary boundaries and specializations. Institutional and disciplinary isolation -- and preaching to the choir -- constitute a prison of their own. Unexpected collaborations can offer productive strategies, and it is hoped that Cryptome and Cartome libraries offer useful tools towards the conceptualization of such novel strategies." -- Deborah Natsios, Reversing the Panopticon, August 16, 2001 (at Cartome) "A sparsely attended trial which unfolded in Tacoma’s US district courthouse the first week of April 2001 hardly seemed an event that might open a small but revealing view onto the shifting national security apparatus. But to outside observers following the criminal prosecution of Washington State resident Jim Bell, accused of stalking and intimidating local agents of the IRS, Treasury Department and BATF, the defendant was a symptomatic target, and the government’s stated case against him only a fragment of a more complex campaign linked to the evolving landscape of national and homeland defense. In the government’s estimation, Bell had placed its Pacific Northwest agents "in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury". But for some trial-watchers, the case against James Dalton Bell, 43, was underpinned by a constellation of factors that made him more than the disaffected neighbor projecting antigovernment bile. Bell had invited the government’s fullest prosecutorial zeal because his technical skills placed him in more ambiguous terrain, that of untested gray zones within emerging national defense landscapes, which, by calling into question the impregnability of the national border, have been taking national security tactics incountry in unprecedented ways, deploying new rules of engagement to challenge national security threats within the US domestic interior." -- Deborah Natsios, Homeland Defense and the Prosecution of Jim Bell, June 8, 2001 (At Cartome.org)

Cartome, a companion site to Cryptome, has been inaugurated. It is an archive of spatial and geographic documents on privacy, cryptography, dual-use technologies, national security and intelligence -- communicated by imagery systems: cartography, photography, photogrammetry, steganography, climatography, seismography, geography, camouflage, maps, images, drawings, charts, diagrams, imagery intelligence (IMINT) and their reverse-panopticon and counter-deception potential. Administrator is architect Deborah Natsios, longtime Cryptome partner. "But Admiral Wilson wins the award for the most creative neologism, C3D2, which stands for 'cover, concealment, camouflage, denial and deception,' as in: 'Many potential adversaries -- nations, groups, and individuals -- are undertaking more and increasingly sophisticated C3D2 operations against the United States.' " -- Vernon Loeb, CIA's Tenet Finds the Going Easier in 2001, February 19, 2001 (offsite)

Note: Due to recurring problems with abuse by spiders, bots, siphons and various automatic download programs, the originating addresses of all such programs will now be blocked. Please help stop burgeoning spider abuse.

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